HTTP routes

The machine-readable version of this page is an OpenAPI document. pithy contract writes one per Worker, with every route it composes, its parameters, its responses and its verification strategy, and the kit publishes its own as docs/openapi.generated.json. Generate a client from that; read this page to understand it.

Read this as a table of two columns

The strategy column is verification strategies, the scopes are dashboard scopes, refusals carry an error code, and what mounts them is the Worker contract.

A path, and the strategy that guards it. There is no implicit authentication anywhere in the kit, so every row below names one of five:

StrategyWho gets in
bearerA session token in Authorization: Bearer. Not the JWT access token, which is for services outside your Worker
sessionA cookie session, CSRF-guarded
signed-webhookThe sender’s own proof, over the exact bytes received
control-planeA scoped machine credential the customer issued. Default-denied
publicNobody is checked. A deliberate choice, written down

bearer and session are one guard in practice — requireAuth() accepts either, and the rows below say user where that guard runs. What separates them is the client, not the route.

Every base path is yours to move

The prefixes below are defaults. Each is a config key, and moving one moves every route under it.

CapabilityDefault prefix
Auth/auth
MCP/mcp
Organization/organizations
Payments/payments
Storage/storage, and /s for share links
Media/media
Email/email
Vector/vector
Artifacts/artifacts
Secrets/secrets
Support/support
Testers/testers
Audit/audit
Consent/consent
Ledger/ledger
Leaderboard/leaderboard
Matchmaking/matchmaking
Multiplayer/multiplayer
Rating/rating
The control plane/control-plane

Auth

RouteStrategy
POST /auth/token/rotateuser + CSRF — the session token it spends is the proof, and a bearer request is exempt from the CSRF guard
GET /auth/sign-in/social/startpublic — a native app opens it in the system browser’s sign-in sheet. Refuses a navigation another page started
POST /auth/handoffpublic — the one-time code and its verifier are the credential
POST /auth/attestation/challengepublic — a single-use challenge for a native app attestation. Mounted only when some environment has an attestation block
POST /auth/attestation/ios/keyspublic — registers an iOS app’s App Attest key once, from Apple’s attestation of it. Mounted only when some environment has an attestation block
GET /auth/devicesuser
POST /auth/devices/revokeuser + CSRF
DELETE /auth/accountuser + CSRF — delete my own account. A suspended account still reaches it
POST /auth/link-socialuser
POST /auth/unlink-accountuser
GET /auth/profile/imageuser
GET /auth/admin/userscontrol-plane — refuses ?search= with a 400
POST /auth/admin/users/searchcontrol-plane · auth:users:read — by email or display name, the term in the body
GET /auth/admin/users/:userIdcontrol-plane
GET /auth/admin/devicescontrol-plane
POST /auth/admin/sessions/revokecontrol-plane
POST /auth/admin/users/:userId/sessions/revokecontrol-plane
POST /auth/admin/users/:userId/devices/revokecontrol-plane
POST /auth/admin/users/:userId/suspendcontrol-plane · auth:users:suspend
POST /auth/admin/users/:userId/reinstatecontrol-plane · auth:users:suspend
DELETE /auth/admin/users/:userIdcontrol-plane · auth:users:delete
POST /auth/admin/users/:userId/restorecontrol-plane · auth:users:delete
POST /auth/admin/users/:userId/exportcontrol-plane · auth:users:export — the reason in the body
GET /auth/admin/verificationscontrol-plane · auth:verifications:read — every sign-in link and code sent in a window, and where each stands
ALL /auth/*Better Auth’s own surface

That last row is most of what a sign-in flow actually calls. Sign-in, sign-out, the OAuth callback, verification, /token, /jwks and session listing are Better Auth’s endpoints, mounted under the same prefix and answering in Better Auth’s own response shape — deliberately, because createAuthClient is a documented client surface and re-homing the body would strand every adopter reading error.code.

The admin routes are registered before the catch-all, or they would be dead: /auth/admin/users would reach Better Auth, which knows no such endpoint, and the 404 would come from the wrong layer entirely.

When Turnstile is composed, the magic-link and OTP send routes wear the humanity check automatically. You do not wire that. With an attestation block for the environment, a native app sends an attestation in the x-pithy-attestation header in its place, against a challenge from /auth/attestation/challenge, and a request carrying one is judged by it alone. An iOS app registers its App Attest key once at /auth/attestation/ios/keys before its first send; an Android app sends a Play Integrity token, which the Worker decodes through Google, and needs no route of its own. Native app attestation has the flow.

The two native routes are the redirect half of a phone’s sign-in. The app starts a social sign-in at /auth/sign-in/social/start so the provider’s state cookie lands in the sign-in sheet, and trades the one-time code the sign-in returns to its link for the session token at /auth/handoff. Sign in on iOS and Android has the flow.

Turnstile

RouteStrategy
GET /turnstile/widgetpublic — the login widget as a page a native app loads in a WebView
GET /turnstile/admin/widgetscontrol-plane · turnstile:widgets:read — which widget guards this environment, and how its challenges went

The widget page carries only what the client projection already ships: the public sitekey and the login action. It answers 404 where no login widget is set up. The turnstile reference has both routes.

MCP

RouteStrategy
POST /mcpbearer — a token this application minted for this endpoint, and the caller must clear mcp({ floor })
GET, DELETE /mcppublic — always 405, Allow: POST
GET /mcp/consentuser — what an application asking to act as you will be able to do
POST /mcp/consentuser + CSRF — approve or refuse
GET /mcp/connectionsuser — the applications acting as you
DELETE /mcp/connections/:clientIduser + CSRF — revoke one
GET /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcppublic — RFC 9728, where a client starts
GET /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/authpublic — RFC 8414, the authorization server’s metadata

Every tool call on POST /mcp runs the route it names, as the caller, through every guard that route carries, so this table is the whole of what the endpoint adds. The OAuth endpoints themselves — registration, authorize, token — are Better Auth’s, under /auth. Letting your users’ agents in has the flow.

Organization

RouteStrategy
GET /organizationsuser
POST /organizationsuser
POST /organizations/actinguser
GET /organizations/currentuser
PATCH /organizations/currentuser
DELETE /organizations/currentuser
GET /organizations/current/membersuser
PATCH /organizations/current/members/:membershipIduser
DELETE /organizations/current/members/:membershipIduser
POST /organizations/current/members/leaveuser
GET /organizations/current/invitationsuser
POST /organizations/current/invitationsuser
DELETE /organizations/current/invitations/:invitationIduser
POST /organizations/current/invitations/:invitationId/resenduser
GET /organizations/invitations/:tokenpublic — the invitation link
POST /organizations/invitations/acceptuser
GET /organizations/current/ownershipuser
POST /organizations/current/ownershipuser
DELETE /organizations/current/ownershipuser
POST /organizations/ownership/acceptuser
GET /organizations/marks/organization/:organizationIduser
GET /organizations/members/:membershipId/imageuser
GET /organizations/admin/organizationscontrol-plane · organization:accounts:read
GET /organizations/admin/organizations/:organizationId/memberscontrol-plane · organization:members:read
GET /organizations/admin/rolescontrol-plane · organization:members:read — the role catalog, and the owning role the roster writes refuse
PATCH /organizations/admin/organizations/:organizationIdcontrol-plane · organization:accounts:write — name, short name, seat limit
POST /organizations/admin/organizations/:organizationId/memberscontrol-plane · organization:members:write — add an existing user
PATCH /organizations/admin/organizations/:organizationId/members/:membershipIdcontrol-plane · organization:members:write — change a role
DELETE /organizations/admin/organizations/:organizationId/members/:membershipIdcontrol-plane · organization:members:write
POST /organizations/admin/organizations/:organizationId/invitations/listcontrol-plane · organization:members:write — the outstanding invitations, the reason in the body
POST /organizations/admin/organizations/:organizationId/invitations/:invitationId/resendcontrol-plane · organization:members:write
DELETE /organizations/admin/organizations/:organizationId/invitations/:invitationIdcontrol-plane · organization:members:write
POST /organizations/admin/organizations/:organizationId/ownershipcontrol-plane · organization:ownership:transfer — force ownership
POST /organizations/admin/organizations/:organizationId/suspendcontrol-plane · organization:accounts:suspend — suspend a tenant
POST /organizations/admin/organizations/:organizationId/suspend/previewcontrol-plane · organization:accounts:suspend — who the cascade would reach; writes nothing
POST /organizations/admin/organizations/:organizationId/reinstatecontrol-plane · organization:accounts:suspend
DELETE /organizations/admin/organizations/:organizationIdcontrol-plane · organization:accounts:delete — soft or hard
POST /organizations/admin/organizations/:organizationId/delete/previewcontrol-plane · organization:accounts:delete — who the cascade would reach; writes nothing
POST /organizations/admin/organizations/:organizationId/restorecontrol-plane · organization:accounts:delete

Who may do what inside an organization is the member’s role, checked in the handler. The strategy column says only who gets as far as the handler. Using Organization has the member routes, and the organization reference names the power each one gates on.

The operator’s writes never move the owning role. An add at it, a role change to or from it, and the removal of an owner are refused on the roster routes, whatever else the connection holds, and the refusal names the ownership route — the one place ownership moves, under its own scope. GET /organizations/admin/roles names that role ahead of time, as owningRole, so a client never offers it. Every control-plane row after the three reads takes a required reason, and every one but the two previews is audited, the invitation listing included. The ownership routes, user and control-plane alike, mount only where the project declares an ownership pair. Membership administration has the rules.

Payments

RouteStrategy
POST /payments/purchasesuser
GET /payments/entitlementsuser
POST /payments/restoreuser
POST /payments/checkoutuser
GET /payments/checkout/resumepublic — Paddle only; the transaction id is the buyer’s own
POST /payments/portaluser
GET /payments/pricinguser
GET /payments/subscriptionuser
POST /payments/subscription/previewuser
POST /payments/subscription/changeuser
POST /payments/subscription/canceluser
POST /payments/subscription/keepuser
POST /payments/subscription/refunduser
POST /payments/webhooks/applesigned-webhook
POST /payments/webhooks/googlesigned-webhook
POST /payments/webhooks/stripesigned-webhook
POST /payments/webhooks/lemon-squeezysigned-webhook
POST /payments/webhooks/paddlesigned-webhook
GET /payments/admin/catalogcontrol-plane
GET /payments/admin/purchasescontrol-plane
GET /payments/admin/subscriptionscontrol-plane
GET /payments/admin/entitlementscontrol-plane
GET /payments/admin/entitlements/:subjectType/:subjectIdcontrol-plane
GET /payments/admin/overridescontrol-plane · payments:entitlements:read
GET /payments/admin/usage-runscontrol-plane · payments:usage:read
GET /payments/admin/webhook-eventscontrol-plane · payments:webhooks:read — every notification a store sent, and what each became
GET /payments/admin/reconcile-runscontrol-plane · payments:reconcile:read
POST /payments/admin/reconcile-runscontrol-plane · payments:reconcile:run
GET /payments/admin/discountscontrol-plane
POST /payments/admin/discountscontrol-plane
POST /payments/entitlements/grantcontrol-plane
POST /payments/entitlements/revokecontrol-plane
POST /payments/entitlements/overridescontrol-plane · payments:overrides:set
POST /payments/entitlements/overrides/unrestrictedcontrol-plane · payments:overrides:unrestricted
POST /payments/entitlements/overrides/clearcontrol-plane · payments:overrides:clear

GET /payments/checkout/resume is public on purpose. Paddle sends a buyer back to your payment link with ?_ptxn=<transaction id> — a dunning mail, an invoice, a card update — and that buyer is usually signed out. It discloses nothing a pricing page does not already ship, and it never reads the transaction from Paddle, so it cannot tell a stranger whether an id exists.

A grant is a control-plane call, not an admin user’s click. Comping somebody a year of Pro leaves a row signed by an issued credential with a scope on it, which is a different kind of record from a session that happened to belong to staff.

Storage

RouteStrategy
POST /storageuser — start an upload
GET /storageuser — list
POST /storage/:id/completeuser
POST /storage/:id/abortuser
GET /storage/:id/partsuser
POST /storage/:id/copyuser
POST /storage/:id/sharesuser — mint a share link
DELETE /storage/shares/:tokenuser — revoke one
GET /storage/:id/urluser — presign
PATCH /storage/:iduser
DELETE /storage/:iduser
HEAD /storage/:iduser
GET /storage/:idpublic, and the handler authorizes
GET /s/:tokenpublic — the token is the credential
GET /storage/admin/usagecontrol-plane · storage:usage:read

GET /storage/:id carries no requireAuth, on purpose: a public object has to be readable without a session, so authorization moves into the handler where it can see whether this object is public. The HEAD beside it does require a session — a metadata probe is not a download. Past the strategy, every object route checks the file’s visibility, and a file the caller may not read answers not found.

Artifacts

RouteStrategy
POST /artifacts/reposuser — create one you own
GET /artifacts/reposuser — what you own or hold a grant on
GET /artifacts/repos/:nameuser
DELETE /artifacts/repos/:nameuser, owner only
POST /artifacts/repos/:name/grantsuser, owner only
DELETE /artifacts/repos/:name/grants/:userIduser, owner only
POST /artifacts/repos/:name/credentialsuser — mint a token at your scope
DELETE /artifacts/repos/:name/credentialsuser, owner only — revoke every token
GET /artifacts/repos/:name/loguser
GET /artifacts/repos/:name/commits/:hashuser
GET /artifacts/repos/:name/tree/:hashuser
GET /artifacts/repos/:name/blob/:hashuser
GET /artifacts/repos/:name/fileuser
POST /artifacts/organization/reposuser · managePower in the acting organization
GET /artifacts/organization/reposuser · managePower in the acting organization
GET /artifacts/admin/reposcontrol-plane · artifacts:repos:read — every repository, newest first
GET /artifacts/admin/repos/:namecontrol-plane · artifacts:repos:read — one repository, its grants and its log
GET /artifacts/admin/repos/:name/tokenscontrol-plane · artifacts:repos:read — every token, with its holder where the kit minted it
POST /artifacts/admin/repos/:name/tokens/:tokenId/revokecontrol-plane · artifacts:tokens:revoke
POST /artifacts/admin/repos/:name/tokens/revokecontrol-plane · artifacts:tokens:revoke — every live token

Past the strategy, every repository route checks ownership and the grant row, and a repository the caller may not see answers the same 404 as one that does not exist. The two organization routes mount only where organization is composed. The two revokes take an idempotency key and a required reason, and each is audited.

Media

RouteStrategy
POST /mediauser
GET /mediauser
POST /media/:id/finalizeuser
POST /media/duplicatesuser
GET /media/:idpublic, and the handler authorizes
GET /media/:id/urlpublic, and the handler authorizes — a signed delivery URL
PATCH /media/:iduser
DELETE /media/:iduser
GET /media/admin/usagecontrol-plane · media:usage:read
GET /media/admin/deliverycontrol-plane · media:delivery:read — what was served, per asset, in a window

The two reads carry no requireAuth, for the same reason as storage’s download: a public record has to be readable without a session. Any other record answers not found to anyone it is not visible to.

Email

RouteStrategy
GET /email/jobscontrol-plane · email:jobs:read
GET /email/jobs/:idcontrol-plane · email:jobs:read
POST /email/jobs/:id/retrycontrol-plane · email:jobs:retry
GET /email/suppressionscontrol-plane · email:suppressions:read
POST /email/suppressions/lookupcontrol-plane · email:suppressions:read — one address, in the body
POST /email/suppressionscontrol-plane · email:suppressions:write
POST /email/suppressions/removecontrol-plane · email:suppressions:delete
GET /_pithy/email/c/:tokenpublic — a click
GET /_pithy/email/o/:tokenpublic — an open
GET /_pithy/email/u/:tokenpublic — the unsubscribe page; records nothing
POST /_pithy/email/u/:tokenpublic — unsubscribe, from the page’s button or a one-click header; reason in the form body

There is no end-user surface in the management file at all. A recipient interacts with email by receiving it; the routes a recipient calls are the public callbacks, and each is gated by the seal on the token in its path. The token decodes to nothing, so the link a request log records names nobody, and no callback reads a query string.

Looking a suppression up and removing one are POSTs with a body, not ?email= or DELETE /suppressions/:address. An address in a path or a query string is an address in every access log, proxy, trace and referrer between the client and the Worker, so the listing refuses ?email= with a 400.

Vector

RouteStrategy
POST /vector/:index/documentsuser
POST /vector/:index/queryuser
GET /vector/:index/documents/:iduser
DELETE /vector/:index/documents/:iduser

Secrets

RouteStrategy
GET /secrets/admin/statuscontrol-plane · secrets:status:read
GET /secrets/admin/status/:name/rotationscontrol-plane
POST /secrets/admin/status/:name/rotatecontrol-plane

Status, and never value. Nothing on this surface returns a secret; it returns whether one exists, when it was last rotated, and what happened on each rotation.

Audit

RouteStrategy
GET /audit/eventscontrol-plane
GET /audit/events/:eventIdcontrol-plane
GET /audit/control-plane/access-historycontrol-plane · audit:events:read — every membership, connection and key change in a window, with its before and after
GET /audit/control-plane/usagecontrol-plane · audit:events:read — for one connection, or every one when none is named, which scopes it exercised and was refused, per key, in a window
GET /audit/control-plane/reachcontrol-plane · audit:events:read — everything one connection or key reached in a window, by tenant, route and outcome, and a route expanded into the subjects it touched
GET /audit/control-plane/sinkscontrol-plane · audit:events:read — every sink the trail ships to, with its host and filter, its backlog, its last delivery and its dead letters; never its token, URL path or query
GET /audit/control-plane/verifycontrol-plane · audit:events:export — whether one tenant’s hash chain is whole over a window, or its first break
GET /audit/control-plane/exportcontrol-plane · audit:events:export — one tenant’s chain in canonical form, a page at a time

Reads only. The trail is append-only, and this surface has no write route to omit — there is nothing to leave out, because there is nothing there.

RouteStrategy
GET /consent/purposespublic
GET /consent/mepublic — the signed-in account, or the visitor whose cookie or x-pithy-consent-visitor header came with it
GET /consent/me/documents/:hashpublic — only a document the caller’s own record names
POST /consent/grantspublic + same-origin, rate-limited per IP. A phone’s cookie-less request is exempt from same-origin
POST /consent/withdrawalspublic + same-origin, rate-limited per IP. A phone’s cookie-less request is exempt from same-origin
GET /consent/control-plane/purposescontrol-plane · consent:read — counts per purpose and notice version, the expired grants among them
GET /consent/control-plane/expiringcontrol-plane · consent:read — the grants expired or expiring within within days, soonest first, paged
GET /consent/control-plane/subjects/:kind/:subjectIdcontrol-plane · consent:read — one subject’s record and merges
GET /consent/control-plane/documents/:hashcontrol-plane · consent:read — a signed document, byte for byte
GET /consent/control-plane/evidence/:hashcontrol-plane · consent:read — a drawn signature or certificate, as an attachment

A visitor consents with no account, so the two writes are held to the same-origin gate and a per-IP limit instead of a session. A visitor’s first choice sets the device-id cookie; nothing else does. A signed-out phone has no cookie, so it sends a visitor id of consent’s own in x-pithy-consent-visitor, read only from a request that carries no cookie at all — nothing in such a request is ambient, which is why same-origin does not apply to it. There is no control-plane write: consent is the person’s to give and to take back.

Support

RouteStrategy
POST /support/feedbackuser — open a thread
GET /support/feedbackuser — my threads
GET /support/feedback/:iduser
GET /support/threadscontrol-plane — the inbox list, which takes no q
POST /support/threads/searchcontrol-plane · support:threads:read — ranked threads, by keyword, by meaning or both, the words in the body
GET /support/threads/:idcontrol-plane
GET /support/repliescontrol-plane
POST /support/threads/:id/archivecontrol-plane
POST /support/threads/:id/assigncontrol-plane · support:threads:assign
POST /support/threads/:id/replycontrol-plane
POST /support/threads/:id/reclassifycontrol-plane
POST /support/threads/:id/flagscontrol-plane
POST /support/staff/threads/:id/assignuser — same-origin, and the assignPower named in support({ staff })

Support also serves the two {basePath} presence routes below, for its support.thread room.

Testers

RouteStrategy
GET /testers/confirm/:tokenpublic — the invitation link
GET /testers/opt-in/:tokenpublic
GET, POST /testers/opt-out/:tokenpublic
GET /testers/statususer
GET /testers/cohortscontrol-plane
POST /testers/invitecontrol-plane
POST /testers/resendcontrol-plane
POST /testers/removecontrol-plane
POST /testers/nudgecontrol-plane

Opting out answers both verbs. A one-click unsubscribe header sends a POST; a person clicking the same link in a mail client sends a GET. Refusing either would refuse somebody trying to leave.

Ledger

RouteStrategy
GET /ledger/:currencyuser — my balance
GET /ledger/:currency/transactionsuser
POST /ledger/:currency/credituser + an admin scope
POST /ledger/:currency/debituser + an admin scope
GET /ledger/admin/accountscontrol-plane · ledger:accounts:read
GET /ledger/admin/accounts/:userIdcontrol-plane · ledger:accounts:read
GET /ledger/admin/accounts/:userId/:currency/transactionscontrol-plane · ledger:transactions:read
POST /ledger/admin/accounts/:userId/:currency/creditcontrol-plane · ledger:accounts:adjust
POST /ledger/admin/accounts/:userId/:currency/debitcontrol-plane · ledger:accounts:adjust — never below available
POST /ledger/admin/accounts/:userId/:currency/reversecontrol-plane · ledger:accounts:adjust — the opposite movement, as a new entry
POST /ledger/admin/accounts/:userId/:currency/releasecontrol-plane · ledger:accounts:adjust — an open hold

The two player-facing write routes stack a second guard on the first. A session alone reaches the balance; moving a balance also requires the configured admin scope on the caller. A user who could credit themselves is not a ledger. The four control-plane writes take an idempotency key and a required reason in the body, the account in the path and never in the body, and each that moves money is audited. The ledger reference has their rules.

Games

Leaderboard

RouteStrategy
GET /leaderboarduser
GET /leaderboard/:board/topuser
GET /leaderboard/:board/meuser
GET /leaderboard/:board/arounduser
POST /leaderboard/:board/segmentuser
PUT /leaderboard/:board/me/visibilityuser
POST /leaderboard/:boarduser + the submit scope, when server-authoritative
PUT /leaderboard/:board/entries/:userId/hiddenuser + admin scope
DELETE /leaderboard/:board/entries/:userIduser + admin scope
GET /leaderboard/admin/boardscontrol-plane · leaderboard:entries:read — every board, and the window open now
GET /leaderboard/admin/boards/:board/entriescontrol-plane · leaderboard:entries:read — one window, paged, hidden entries in place
GET /leaderboard/admin/lockscontrol-plane · leaderboard:entries:read — the rank-refresh lock
POST /leaderboard/admin/boards/:board/entries/:userId/hidecontrol-plane · leaderboard:entries:moderate
POST /leaderboard/admin/boards/:board/entries/:userId/unhidecontrol-plane · leaderboard:entries:moderate
POST /leaderboard/admin/boards/:board/entries/:userId/correctcontrol-plane · leaderboard:entries:moderate — within the board’s min and max
POST /leaderboard/admin/locks/:name/clearcontrol-plane · leaderboard:entries:moderate — naming the holder it clears

Rating

RouteStrategy
POST /rating/games/:game/outcomesuser + the record scope, when server-authoritative
GET /rating/games/:game/meuser
GET /rating/games/:game/players/:userIduser
GET /rating/admin/poolscontrol-plane · rating:players:read — every pool and its algorithm
GET /rating/admin/pools/:pool/playerscontrol-plane · rating:players:read — a pool’s ratings by skill, paged
GET /rating/admin/pools/:pool/players/:userIdcontrol-plane · rating:players:read — one rating and its logged outcomes, paged
POST /rating/admin/pools/:pool/players/:userId/recalculatecontrol-plane · rating:players:adjust — replays the outcome log
POST /rating/admin/pools/:pool/players/:userId/resetcontrol-plane · rating:players:adjust — to the algorithm’s starting state

Multiplayer

RouteStrategy
POST /multiplayer/games/:gameuser
POST /multiplayer/sessions/:id/joinuser
POST /multiplayer/sessions/:id/actionuser
POST /multiplayer/sessions/:id/leaveuser
POST /multiplayer/sessions/:id/closeuser
GET /multiplayer/sessions/:iduser
GET /multiplayer/sessions/:id/resultuser
GET /multiplayer/sessions/:id/socketuser — the WebSocket upgrade
GET /multiplayer/admin/sessionscontrol-plane · multiplayer:sessions:read — the sessions in flight, paged
GET /multiplayer/admin/sessions/:idcontrol-plane · multiplayer:sessions:read — one session, from its Durable Object, never the game’s state
GET /multiplayer/admin/resultscontrol-plane · multiplayer:sessions:read — results, paged, with any void
POST /multiplayer/admin/sessions/:id/closecontrol-plane · multiplayer:sessions:moderate — ends it with no result
POST /multiplayer/admin/results/:id/voidcontrol-plane · multiplayer:sessions:moderate — leaderboard and rating take it back

Matchmaking

RouteStrategy
POST /matchmaking/games/:game/roomsuser
POST /matchmaking/rooms/:code/joinuser
POST /matchmaking/games/:game/invitesuser
GET /matchmaking/invitesuser
POST /matchmaking/invites/:id/acceptuser
POST /matchmaking/invites/:id/declineuser
GET /matchmaking/friendsuser
POST /matchmaking/friends/:userId/requestuser
POST /matchmaking/friends/:userId/acceptuser
POST /matchmaking/friends/:userId/declineuser
DELETE /matchmaking/friends/:userIduser
POST /matchmaking/games/:game/queueuser
GET /matchmaking/games/:game/queueuser
DELETE /matchmaking/games/:game/queueuser
GET /matchmaking/presenceuser
GET /matchmaking/admin/gamescontrol-plane · matchmaking:queues:read — every configured game and the key its routes take, from config
GET /matchmaking/admin/games/:game/queuecontrol-plane · matchmaking:queues:read — who is waiting, from the queue object
GET /matchmaking/admin/games/:game/roomscontrol-plane · matchmaking:queues:read — open rooms, paged
GET /matchmaking/admin/invitescontrol-plane · matchmaking:queues:read — pending invites, paged
POST /matchmaking/admin/invites/:id/cancelcontrol-plane · matchmaking:queues:moderate
POST /matchmaking/admin/games/:game/queue/:userId/dropcontrol-plane · matchmaking:queues:moderate

serverAuthoritative is the switch worth understanding before you ship a game. With it on, a score or an outcome is only accepted from a caller carrying the configured scope — which means from your own server, not from a client somebody can open in a debugger. Every scope in this table is filled by auth’s resolveScopes, per request, and by nothing else. With no resolver, each of those routes refuses every caller. Server-authoritative writes is how your server proves it is the caller.

The control plane, and the kit’s own paths

RouteStrategy
GET /control-plane/pingcontrol-plane — any verified caller
GET /control-plane/manifestcontrol-plane · manifest read
GET /control-plane/keyscontrol-plane · keys rotate
POST /control-plane/keyscontrol-plane · keys rotate
POST /control-plane/keys/:keyId/expirecontrol-plane · keys rotate
GET /control-plane/connectionscontrol-plane · connections:read — every connection in this environment
POST /control-plane/connections/lookupcontrol-plane · connections:read — the connections one email authorized, the email in the body
POST /control-plane/connections/:connectionId/revokecontrol-plane · connections:revoke — never the caller’s own
GET /control-plane/migrationscontrol-plane · migrations:read
GET /control-plane/privacycontrol-plane · privacy:read
GET /control-plane/evidencecontrol-plane · evidence:read — SOC 2 and ISO 27001 evidence, per control
GET /control-plane/processingcontrol-plane · processing:read — the GDPR Article 30 record of processing, with every gap named
GET /control-plane/erasurecontrol-plane · erasure:read — every purge in a period, counted, and each failed or overdue one named
GET /control-plane/erasure/:subjectType/:subjectIdcontrol-plane · erasure:read — one user’s or organization’s erasure, attested
GET /control-plane/holdscontrol-plane · retention:read — every legal hold, standing first, with the count standing
POST /control-plane/holdscontrol-plane · retention:hold — place a legal hold on a user, an organization or a tenant’s audit trail, with a reason
POST /control-plane/holds/:holdId/releasecontrol-plane · retention:hold — release a standing hold, with a reason
POST /control-plane/presence/ticketscontrol-plane · the room kind’s own scope, named by the body
POST {basePath}/presence/ticketsuser — the declaring capability’s own read permission for the record
GET {basePath}/presence/rooms/:kind/:recordIdpublic — the WebSocket upgrade, and a single-use ticket in the subprotocol offer is the credential
GET /healthpublic — status and the deployed version
POST /__pithy/workflows/:bindingthe kit’s own durable-job dispatch
GET /__pithy/dev-loginlocal development only

/health is public because a health check that needs a credential is a health check nothing runs.

The two {basePath} presence routes mount under each capability that declares presence rooms, and only there. The socket’s strategy is public because a browser’s WebSocket sets no headers; the ticket in Sec-WebSocket-Protocol is what is checked, and a missing or bad one is refused before the upgrade.

Two things this list implies

Your asset allowlist is derived from this table. run_worker_first has to name the paths the Worker owns, and every path above is one — which is why the CLI computes the list rather than asking you to keep one by hand.

A capability you have not composed mounts nothing. These are not reserved paths waiting to be claimed. Remove the capability and its prefix is free.

ESC