The machine-readable version of this page is an OpenAPI document. pithy contract writes one per Worker, with every route it composes, its parameters, its responses and its verification strategy, and the kit publishes its own as docs/openapi.generated.json. Generate a client from that; read this page to understand it.
Read this as a table of two columns
The strategy column is verification strategies, the scopes are dashboard scopes, refusals carry an error code, and what mounts them is the Worker contract.
A path, and the strategy that guards it. There is no implicit authentication anywhere in the kit, so every row below names one of five:
| Strategy | Who gets in |
|---|---|
bearer | A session token in Authorization: Bearer. Not the JWT access token, which is for services outside your Worker |
session | A cookie session, CSRF-guarded |
signed-webhook | The sender’s own proof, over the exact bytes received |
control-plane | A scoped machine credential the customer issued. Default-denied |
public | Nobody is checked. A deliberate choice, written down |
bearer and session are one guard in practice — requireAuth() accepts either, and the rows below say user where that guard runs. What separates them is the client, not the route.
Every base path is yours to move
The prefixes below are defaults. Each is a config key, and moving one moves every route under it.
| Capability | Default prefix |
|---|---|
| Auth | /auth |
| MCP | /mcp |
| Organization | /organizations |
| Payments | /payments |
| Storage | /storage, and /s for share links |
| Media | /media |
/email | |
| Vector | /vector |
| Artifacts | /artifacts |
| Secrets | /secrets |
| Support | /support |
| Testers | /testers |
| Audit | /audit |
| Consent | /consent |
| Ledger | /ledger |
| Leaderboard | /leaderboard |
| Matchmaking | /matchmaking |
| Multiplayer | /multiplayer |
| Rating | /rating |
| The control plane | /control-plane |
Auth
| Route | Strategy |
|---|---|
POST /auth/token/rotate | user + CSRF — the session token it spends is the proof, and a bearer request is exempt from the CSRF guard |
GET /auth/sign-in/social/start | public — a native app opens it in the system browser’s sign-in sheet. Refuses a navigation another page started |
POST /auth/handoff | public — the one-time code and its verifier are the credential |
POST /auth/attestation/challenge | public — a single-use challenge for a native app attestation. Mounted only when some environment has an attestation block |
POST /auth/attestation/ios/keys | public — registers an iOS app’s App Attest key once, from Apple’s attestation of it. Mounted only when some environment has an attestation block |
GET /auth/devices | user |
POST /auth/devices/revoke | user + CSRF |
DELETE /auth/account | user + CSRF — delete my own account. A suspended account still reaches it |
POST /auth/link-social | user |
POST /auth/unlink-account | user |
GET /auth/profile/image | user |
GET /auth/admin/users | control-plane — refuses ?search= with a 400 |
POST /auth/admin/users/search | control-plane · auth:users:read — by email or display name, the term in the body |
GET /auth/admin/users/:userId | control-plane |
GET /auth/admin/devices | control-plane |
POST /auth/admin/sessions/revoke | control-plane |
POST /auth/admin/users/:userId/sessions/revoke | control-plane |
POST /auth/admin/users/:userId/devices/revoke | control-plane |
POST /auth/admin/users/:userId/suspend | control-plane · auth:users:suspend |
POST /auth/admin/users/:userId/reinstate | control-plane · auth:users:suspend |
DELETE /auth/admin/users/:userId | control-plane · auth:users:delete |
POST /auth/admin/users/:userId/restore | control-plane · auth:users:delete |
POST /auth/admin/users/:userId/export | control-plane · auth:users:export — the reason in the body |
GET /auth/admin/verifications | control-plane · auth:verifications:read — every sign-in link and code sent in a window, and where each stands |
ALL /auth/* | Better Auth’s own surface |
That last row is most of what a sign-in flow actually calls. Sign-in, sign-out, the OAuth callback, verification, /token, /jwks and session listing are Better Auth’s endpoints, mounted under the same prefix and answering in Better Auth’s own response shape — deliberately, because createAuthClient is a documented client surface and re-homing the body would strand every adopter reading error.code.
The admin routes are registered before the catch-all, or they would be dead: /auth/admin/users would reach Better Auth, which knows no such endpoint, and the 404 would come from the wrong layer entirely.
When Turnstile is composed, the magic-link and OTP send routes wear the humanity check automatically. You do not wire that. With an attestation block for the environment, a native app sends an attestation in the x-pithy-attestation header in its place, against a challenge from /auth/attestation/challenge, and a request carrying one is judged by it alone. An iOS app registers its App Attest key once at /auth/attestation/ios/keys before its first send; an Android app sends a Play Integrity token, which the Worker decodes through Google, and needs no route of its own. Native app attestation has the flow.
The two native routes are the redirect half of a phone’s sign-in. The app starts a social sign-in at /auth/sign-in/social/start so the provider’s state cookie lands in the sign-in sheet, and trades the one-time code the sign-in returns to its link for the session token at /auth/handoff. Sign in on iOS and Android has the flow.
Turnstile
| Route | Strategy |
|---|---|
GET /turnstile/widget | public — the login widget as a page a native app loads in a WebView |
GET /turnstile/admin/widgets | control-plane · turnstile:widgets:read — which widget guards this environment, and how its challenges went |
The widget page carries only what the client projection already ships: the public sitekey and the login action. It answers 404 where no login widget is set up. The turnstile reference has both routes.
MCP
| Route | Strategy |
|---|---|
POST /mcp | bearer — a token this application minted for this endpoint, and the caller must clear mcp({ floor }) |
GET, DELETE /mcp | public — always 405, Allow: POST |
GET /mcp/consent | user — what an application asking to act as you will be able to do |
POST /mcp/consent | user + CSRF — approve or refuse |
GET /mcp/connections | user — the applications acting as you |
DELETE /mcp/connections/:clientId | user + CSRF — revoke one |
GET /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp | public — RFC 9728, where a client starts |
GET /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/auth | public — RFC 8414, the authorization server’s metadata |
Every tool call on POST /mcp runs the route it names, as the caller, through every guard that route carries, so this table is the whole of what the endpoint adds. The OAuth endpoints themselves — registration, authorize, token — are Better Auth’s, under /auth. Letting your users’ agents in has the flow.
Organization
| Route | Strategy |
|---|---|
GET /organizations | user |
POST /organizations | user |
POST /organizations/acting | user |
GET /organizations/current | user |
PATCH /organizations/current | user |
DELETE /organizations/current | user |
GET /organizations/current/members | user |
PATCH /organizations/current/members/:membershipId | user |
DELETE /organizations/current/members/:membershipId | user |
POST /organizations/current/members/leave | user |
GET /organizations/current/invitations | user |
POST /organizations/current/invitations | user |
DELETE /organizations/current/invitations/:invitationId | user |
POST /organizations/current/invitations/:invitationId/resend | user |
GET /organizations/invitations/:token | public — the invitation link |
POST /organizations/invitations/accept | user |
GET /organizations/current/ownership | user |
POST /organizations/current/ownership | user |
DELETE /organizations/current/ownership | user |
POST /organizations/ownership/accept | user |
GET /organizations/marks/organization/:organizationId | user |
GET /organizations/members/:membershipId/image | user |
GET /organizations/admin/organizations | control-plane · organization:accounts:read |
GET /organizations/admin/organizations/:organizationId/members | control-plane · organization:members:read |
GET /organizations/admin/roles | control-plane · organization:members:read — the role catalog, and the owning role the roster writes refuse |
PATCH /organizations/admin/organizations/:organizationId | control-plane · organization:accounts:write — name, short name, seat limit |
POST /organizations/admin/organizations/:organizationId/members | control-plane · organization:members:write — add an existing user |
PATCH /organizations/admin/organizations/:organizationId/members/:membershipId | control-plane · organization:members:write — change a role |
DELETE /organizations/admin/organizations/:organizationId/members/:membershipId | control-plane · organization:members:write |
POST /organizations/admin/organizations/:organizationId/invitations/list | control-plane · organization:members:write — the outstanding invitations, the reason in the body |
POST /organizations/admin/organizations/:organizationId/invitations/:invitationId/resend | control-plane · organization:members:write |
DELETE /organizations/admin/organizations/:organizationId/invitations/:invitationId | control-plane · organization:members:write |
POST /organizations/admin/organizations/:organizationId/ownership | control-plane · organization:ownership:transfer — force ownership |
POST /organizations/admin/organizations/:organizationId/suspend | control-plane · organization:accounts:suspend — suspend a tenant |
POST /organizations/admin/organizations/:organizationId/suspend/preview | control-plane · organization:accounts:suspend — who the cascade would reach; writes nothing |
POST /organizations/admin/organizations/:organizationId/reinstate | control-plane · organization:accounts:suspend |
DELETE /organizations/admin/organizations/:organizationId | control-plane · organization:accounts:delete — soft or hard |
POST /organizations/admin/organizations/:organizationId/delete/preview | control-plane · organization:accounts:delete — who the cascade would reach; writes nothing |
POST /organizations/admin/organizations/:organizationId/restore | control-plane · organization:accounts:delete |
Who may do what inside an organization is the member’s role, checked in the handler. The strategy column says only who gets as far as the handler. Using Organization has the member routes, and the organization reference names the power each one gates on.
The operator’s writes never move the owning role. An add at it, a role change to or from it, and the removal of an owner are refused on the roster routes, whatever else the connection holds, and the refusal names the ownership route — the one place ownership moves, under its own scope. GET /organizations/admin/roles names that role ahead of time, as owningRole, so a client never offers it. Every control-plane row after the three reads takes a required reason, and every one but the two previews is audited, the invitation listing included. The ownership routes, user and control-plane alike, mount only where the project declares an ownership pair. Membership administration has the rules.
Payments
| Route | Strategy |
|---|---|
POST /payments/purchases | user |
GET /payments/entitlements | user |
POST /payments/restore | user |
POST /payments/checkout | user |
GET /payments/checkout/resume | public — Paddle only; the transaction id is the buyer’s own |
POST /payments/portal | user |
GET /payments/pricing | user |
GET /payments/subscription | user |
POST /payments/subscription/preview | user |
POST /payments/subscription/change | user |
POST /payments/subscription/cancel | user |
POST /payments/subscription/keep | user |
POST /payments/subscription/refund | user |
POST /payments/webhooks/apple | signed-webhook |
POST /payments/webhooks/google | signed-webhook |
POST /payments/webhooks/stripe | signed-webhook |
POST /payments/webhooks/lemon-squeezy | signed-webhook |
POST /payments/webhooks/paddle | signed-webhook |
GET /payments/admin/catalog | control-plane |
GET /payments/admin/purchases | control-plane |
GET /payments/admin/subscriptions | control-plane |
GET /payments/admin/entitlements | control-plane |
GET /payments/admin/entitlements/:subjectType/:subjectId | control-plane |
GET /payments/admin/overrides | control-plane · payments:entitlements:read |
GET /payments/admin/usage-runs | control-plane · payments:usage:read |
GET /payments/admin/webhook-events | control-plane · payments:webhooks:read — every notification a store sent, and what each became |
GET /payments/admin/reconcile-runs | control-plane · payments:reconcile:read |
POST /payments/admin/reconcile-runs | control-plane · payments:reconcile:run |
GET /payments/admin/discounts | control-plane |
POST /payments/admin/discounts | control-plane |
POST /payments/entitlements/grant | control-plane |
POST /payments/entitlements/revoke | control-plane |
POST /payments/entitlements/overrides | control-plane · payments:overrides:set |
POST /payments/entitlements/overrides/unrestricted | control-plane · payments:overrides:unrestricted |
POST /payments/entitlements/overrides/clear | control-plane · payments:overrides:clear |
GET /payments/checkout/resume is public on purpose. Paddle sends a buyer back to your payment link with ?_ptxn=<transaction id> — a dunning mail, an invoice, a card update — and that buyer is usually signed out. It discloses nothing a pricing page does not already ship, and it never reads the transaction from Paddle, so it cannot tell a stranger whether an id exists.
A grant is a control-plane call, not an admin user’s click. Comping somebody a year of Pro leaves a row signed by an issued credential with a scope on it, which is a different kind of record from a session that happened to belong to staff.
Storage
| Route | Strategy |
|---|---|
POST /storage | user — start an upload |
GET /storage | user — list |
POST /storage/:id/complete | user |
POST /storage/:id/abort | user |
GET /storage/:id/parts | user |
POST /storage/:id/copy | user |
POST /storage/:id/shares | user — mint a share link |
DELETE /storage/shares/:token | user — revoke one |
GET /storage/:id/url | user — presign |
PATCH /storage/:id | user |
DELETE /storage/:id | user |
HEAD /storage/:id | user |
GET /storage/:id | public, and the handler authorizes |
GET /s/:token | public — the token is the credential |
GET /storage/admin/usage | control-plane · storage:usage:read |
GET /storage/:id carries no requireAuth, on purpose: a public object has to be readable without a session, so authorization moves into the handler where it can see whether this object is public. The HEAD beside it does require a session — a metadata probe is not a download. Past the strategy, every object route checks the file’s visibility, and a file the caller may not read answers not found.
Artifacts
| Route | Strategy |
|---|---|
POST /artifacts/repos | user — create one you own |
GET /artifacts/repos | user — what you own or hold a grant on |
GET /artifacts/repos/:name | user |
DELETE /artifacts/repos/:name | user, owner only |
POST /artifacts/repos/:name/grants | user, owner only |
DELETE /artifacts/repos/:name/grants/:userId | user, owner only |
POST /artifacts/repos/:name/credentials | user — mint a token at your scope |
DELETE /artifacts/repos/:name/credentials | user, owner only — revoke every token |
GET /artifacts/repos/:name/log | user |
GET /artifacts/repos/:name/commits/:hash | user |
GET /artifacts/repos/:name/tree/:hash | user |
GET /artifacts/repos/:name/blob/:hash | user |
GET /artifacts/repos/:name/file | user |
POST /artifacts/organization/repos | user · managePower in the acting organization |
GET /artifacts/organization/repos | user · managePower in the acting organization |
GET /artifacts/admin/repos | control-plane · artifacts:repos:read — every repository, newest first |
GET /artifacts/admin/repos/:name | control-plane · artifacts:repos:read — one repository, its grants and its log |
GET /artifacts/admin/repos/:name/tokens | control-plane · artifacts:repos:read — every token, with its holder where the kit minted it |
POST /artifacts/admin/repos/:name/tokens/:tokenId/revoke | control-plane · artifacts:tokens:revoke |
POST /artifacts/admin/repos/:name/tokens/revoke | control-plane · artifacts:tokens:revoke — every live token |
Past the strategy, every repository route checks ownership and the grant row, and a repository the caller may not see answers the same 404 as one that does not exist. The two organization routes mount only where organization is composed. The two revokes take an idempotency key and a required reason, and each is audited.
Media
| Route | Strategy |
|---|---|
POST /media | user |
GET /media | user |
POST /media/:id/finalize | user |
POST /media/duplicates | user |
GET /media/:id | public, and the handler authorizes |
GET /media/:id/url | public, and the handler authorizes — a signed delivery URL |
PATCH /media/:id | user |
DELETE /media/:id | user |
GET /media/admin/usage | control-plane · media:usage:read |
GET /media/admin/delivery | control-plane · media:delivery:read — what was served, per asset, in a window |
The two reads carry no requireAuth, for the same reason as storage’s download: a public record has to be readable without a session. Any other record answers not found to anyone it is not visible to.
| Route | Strategy |
|---|---|
GET /email/jobs | control-plane · email:jobs:read |
GET /email/jobs/:id | control-plane · email:jobs:read |
POST /email/jobs/:id/retry | control-plane · email:jobs:retry |
GET /email/suppressions | control-plane · email:suppressions:read |
POST /email/suppressions/lookup | control-plane · email:suppressions:read — one address, in the body |
POST /email/suppressions | control-plane · email:suppressions:write |
POST /email/suppressions/remove | control-plane · email:suppressions:delete |
GET /_pithy/email/c/:token | public — a click |
GET /_pithy/email/o/:token | public — an open |
GET /_pithy/email/u/:token | public — the unsubscribe page; records nothing |
POST /_pithy/email/u/:token | public — unsubscribe, from the page’s button or a one-click header; reason in the form body |
There is no end-user surface in the management file at all. A recipient interacts with email by receiving it; the routes a recipient calls are the public callbacks, and each is gated by the seal on the token in its path. The token decodes to nothing, so the link a request log records names nobody, and no callback reads a query string.
Looking a suppression up and removing one are POSTs with a body, not ?email= or DELETE /suppressions/:address. An address in a path or a query string is an address in every access log, proxy, trace and referrer between the client and the Worker, so the listing refuses ?email= with a 400.
Vector
| Route | Strategy |
|---|---|
POST /vector/:index/documents | user |
POST /vector/:index/query | user |
GET /vector/:index/documents/:id | user |
DELETE /vector/:index/documents/:id | user |
Secrets
| Route | Strategy |
|---|---|
GET /secrets/admin/status | control-plane · secrets:status:read |
GET /secrets/admin/status/:name/rotations | control-plane |
POST /secrets/admin/status/:name/rotate | control-plane |
Status, and never value. Nothing on this surface returns a secret; it returns whether one exists, when it was last rotated, and what happened on each rotation.
Audit
| Route | Strategy |
|---|---|
GET /audit/events | control-plane |
GET /audit/events/:eventId | control-plane |
GET /audit/control-plane/access-history | control-plane · audit:events:read — every membership, connection and key change in a window, with its before and after |
GET /audit/control-plane/usage | control-plane · audit:events:read — for one connection, or every one when none is named, which scopes it exercised and was refused, per key, in a window |
GET /audit/control-plane/reach | control-plane · audit:events:read — everything one connection or key reached in a window, by tenant, route and outcome, and a route expanded into the subjects it touched |
GET /audit/control-plane/sinks | control-plane · audit:events:read — every sink the trail ships to, with its host and filter, its backlog, its last delivery and its dead letters; never its token, URL path or query |
GET /audit/control-plane/verify | control-plane · audit:events:export — whether one tenant’s hash chain is whole over a window, or its first break |
GET /audit/control-plane/export | control-plane · audit:events:export — one tenant’s chain in canonical form, a page at a time |
Reads only. The trail is append-only, and this surface has no write route to omit — there is nothing to leave out, because there is nothing there.
Consent
| Route | Strategy |
|---|---|
GET /consent/purposes | public |
GET /consent/me | public — the signed-in account, or the visitor whose cookie or x-pithy-consent-visitor header came with it |
GET /consent/me/documents/:hash | public — only a document the caller’s own record names |
POST /consent/grants | public + same-origin, rate-limited per IP. A phone’s cookie-less request is exempt from same-origin |
POST /consent/withdrawals | public + same-origin, rate-limited per IP. A phone’s cookie-less request is exempt from same-origin |
GET /consent/control-plane/purposes | control-plane · consent:read — counts per purpose and notice version, the expired grants among them |
GET /consent/control-plane/expiring | control-plane · consent:read — the grants expired or expiring within within days, soonest first, paged |
GET /consent/control-plane/subjects/:kind/:subjectId | control-plane · consent:read — one subject’s record and merges |
GET /consent/control-plane/documents/:hash | control-plane · consent:read — a signed document, byte for byte |
GET /consent/control-plane/evidence/:hash | control-plane · consent:read — a drawn signature or certificate, as an attachment |
A visitor consents with no account, so the two writes are held to the same-origin gate and a per-IP limit instead of a session. A visitor’s first choice sets the device-id cookie; nothing else does. A signed-out phone has no cookie, so it sends a visitor id of consent’s own in x-pithy-consent-visitor, read only from a request that carries no cookie at all — nothing in such a request is ambient, which is why same-origin does not apply to it. There is no control-plane write: consent is the person’s to give and to take back.
Support
| Route | Strategy |
|---|---|
POST /support/feedback | user — open a thread |
GET /support/feedback | user — my threads |
GET /support/feedback/:id | user |
GET /support/threads | control-plane — the inbox list, which takes no q |
POST /support/threads/search | control-plane · support:threads:read — ranked threads, by keyword, by meaning or both, the words in the body |
GET /support/threads/:id | control-plane |
GET /support/replies | control-plane |
POST /support/threads/:id/archive | control-plane |
POST /support/threads/:id/assign | control-plane · support:threads:assign |
POST /support/threads/:id/reply | control-plane |
POST /support/threads/:id/reclassify | control-plane |
POST /support/threads/:id/flags | control-plane |
POST /support/staff/threads/:id/assign | user — same-origin, and the assignPower named in support({ staff }) |
Support also serves the two {basePath} presence routes below, for its support.thread room.
Testers
| Route | Strategy |
|---|---|
GET /testers/confirm/:token | public — the invitation link |
GET /testers/opt-in/:token | public |
GET, POST /testers/opt-out/:token | public |
GET /testers/status | user |
GET /testers/cohorts | control-plane |
POST /testers/invite | control-plane |
POST /testers/resend | control-plane |
POST /testers/remove | control-plane |
POST /testers/nudge | control-plane |
Opting out answers both verbs. A one-click unsubscribe header sends a POST; a person clicking the same link in a mail client sends a GET. Refusing either would refuse somebody trying to leave.
Ledger
| Route | Strategy |
|---|---|
GET /ledger/:currency | user — my balance |
GET /ledger/:currency/transactions | user |
POST /ledger/:currency/credit | user + an admin scope |
POST /ledger/:currency/debit | user + an admin scope |
GET /ledger/admin/accounts | control-plane · ledger:accounts:read |
GET /ledger/admin/accounts/:userId | control-plane · ledger:accounts:read |
GET /ledger/admin/accounts/:userId/:currency/transactions | control-plane · ledger:transactions:read |
POST /ledger/admin/accounts/:userId/:currency/credit | control-plane · ledger:accounts:adjust |
POST /ledger/admin/accounts/:userId/:currency/debit | control-plane · ledger:accounts:adjust — never below available |
POST /ledger/admin/accounts/:userId/:currency/reverse | control-plane · ledger:accounts:adjust — the opposite movement, as a new entry |
POST /ledger/admin/accounts/:userId/:currency/release | control-plane · ledger:accounts:adjust — an open hold |
The two player-facing write routes stack a second guard on the first. A session alone reaches the balance; moving a balance also requires the configured admin scope on the caller. A user who could credit themselves is not a ledger. The four control-plane writes take an idempotency key and a required reason in the body, the account in the path and never in the body, and each that moves money is audited. The ledger reference has their rules.
Games
Leaderboard
| Route | Strategy |
|---|---|
GET /leaderboard | user |
GET /leaderboard/:board/top | user |
GET /leaderboard/:board/me | user |
GET /leaderboard/:board/around | user |
POST /leaderboard/:board/segment | user |
PUT /leaderboard/:board/me/visibility | user |
POST /leaderboard/:board | user + the submit scope, when server-authoritative |
PUT /leaderboard/:board/entries/:userId/hidden | user + admin scope |
DELETE /leaderboard/:board/entries/:userId | user + admin scope |
GET /leaderboard/admin/boards | control-plane · leaderboard:entries:read — every board, and the window open now |
GET /leaderboard/admin/boards/:board/entries | control-plane · leaderboard:entries:read — one window, paged, hidden entries in place |
GET /leaderboard/admin/locks | control-plane · leaderboard:entries:read — the rank-refresh lock |
POST /leaderboard/admin/boards/:board/entries/:userId/hide | control-plane · leaderboard:entries:moderate |
POST /leaderboard/admin/boards/:board/entries/:userId/unhide | control-plane · leaderboard:entries:moderate |
POST /leaderboard/admin/boards/:board/entries/:userId/correct | control-plane · leaderboard:entries:moderate — within the board’s min and max |
POST /leaderboard/admin/locks/:name/clear | control-plane · leaderboard:entries:moderate — naming the holder it clears |
Rating
| Route | Strategy |
|---|---|
POST /rating/games/:game/outcomes | user + the record scope, when server-authoritative |
GET /rating/games/:game/me | user |
GET /rating/games/:game/players/:userId | user |
GET /rating/admin/pools | control-plane · rating:players:read — every pool and its algorithm |
GET /rating/admin/pools/:pool/players | control-plane · rating:players:read — a pool’s ratings by skill, paged |
GET /rating/admin/pools/:pool/players/:userId | control-plane · rating:players:read — one rating and its logged outcomes, paged |
POST /rating/admin/pools/:pool/players/:userId/recalculate | control-plane · rating:players:adjust — replays the outcome log |
POST /rating/admin/pools/:pool/players/:userId/reset | control-plane · rating:players:adjust — to the algorithm’s starting state |
Multiplayer
| Route | Strategy |
|---|---|
POST /multiplayer/games/:game | user |
POST /multiplayer/sessions/:id/join | user |
POST /multiplayer/sessions/:id/action | user |
POST /multiplayer/sessions/:id/leave | user |
POST /multiplayer/sessions/:id/close | user |
GET /multiplayer/sessions/:id | user |
GET /multiplayer/sessions/:id/result | user |
GET /multiplayer/sessions/:id/socket | user — the WebSocket upgrade |
GET /multiplayer/admin/sessions | control-plane · multiplayer:sessions:read — the sessions in flight, paged |
GET /multiplayer/admin/sessions/:id | control-plane · multiplayer:sessions:read — one session, from its Durable Object, never the game’s state |
GET /multiplayer/admin/results | control-plane · multiplayer:sessions:read — results, paged, with any void |
POST /multiplayer/admin/sessions/:id/close | control-plane · multiplayer:sessions:moderate — ends it with no result |
POST /multiplayer/admin/results/:id/void | control-plane · multiplayer:sessions:moderate — leaderboard and rating take it back |
Matchmaking
| Route | Strategy |
|---|---|
POST /matchmaking/games/:game/rooms | user |
POST /matchmaking/rooms/:code/join | user |
POST /matchmaking/games/:game/invites | user |
GET /matchmaking/invites | user |
POST /matchmaking/invites/:id/accept | user |
POST /matchmaking/invites/:id/decline | user |
GET /matchmaking/friends | user |
POST /matchmaking/friends/:userId/request | user |
POST /matchmaking/friends/:userId/accept | user |
POST /matchmaking/friends/:userId/decline | user |
DELETE /matchmaking/friends/:userId | user |
POST /matchmaking/games/:game/queue | user |
GET /matchmaking/games/:game/queue | user |
DELETE /matchmaking/games/:game/queue | user |
GET /matchmaking/presence | user |
GET /matchmaking/admin/games | control-plane · matchmaking:queues:read — every configured game and the key its routes take, from config |
GET /matchmaking/admin/games/:game/queue | control-plane · matchmaking:queues:read — who is waiting, from the queue object |
GET /matchmaking/admin/games/:game/rooms | control-plane · matchmaking:queues:read — open rooms, paged |
GET /matchmaking/admin/invites | control-plane · matchmaking:queues:read — pending invites, paged |
POST /matchmaking/admin/invites/:id/cancel | control-plane · matchmaking:queues:moderate |
POST /matchmaking/admin/games/:game/queue/:userId/drop | control-plane · matchmaking:queues:moderate |
serverAuthoritative is the switch worth understanding before you ship a game. With it on, a score or an outcome is only accepted from a caller carrying the configured scope — which means from your own server, not from a client somebody can open in a debugger. Every scope in this table is filled by auth’s resolveScopes, per request, and by nothing else. With no resolver, each of those routes refuses every caller. Server-authoritative writes is how your server proves it is the caller.
The control plane, and the kit’s own paths
| Route | Strategy |
|---|---|
GET /control-plane/ping | control-plane — any verified caller |
GET /control-plane/manifest | control-plane · manifest read |
GET /control-plane/keys | control-plane · keys rotate |
POST /control-plane/keys | control-plane · keys rotate |
POST /control-plane/keys/:keyId/expire | control-plane · keys rotate |
GET /control-plane/connections | control-plane · connections:read — every connection in this environment |
POST /control-plane/connections/lookup | control-plane · connections:read — the connections one email authorized, the email in the body |
POST /control-plane/connections/:connectionId/revoke | control-plane · connections:revoke — never the caller’s own |
GET /control-plane/migrations | control-plane · migrations:read |
GET /control-plane/privacy | control-plane · privacy:read |
GET /control-plane/evidence | control-plane · evidence:read — SOC 2 and ISO 27001 evidence, per control |
GET /control-plane/processing | control-plane · processing:read — the GDPR Article 30 record of processing, with every gap named |
GET /control-plane/erasure | control-plane · erasure:read — every purge in a period, counted, and each failed or overdue one named |
GET /control-plane/erasure/:subjectType/:subjectId | control-plane · erasure:read — one user’s or organization’s erasure, attested |
GET /control-plane/holds | control-plane · retention:read — every legal hold, standing first, with the count standing |
POST /control-plane/holds | control-plane · retention:hold — place a legal hold on a user, an organization or a tenant’s audit trail, with a reason |
POST /control-plane/holds/:holdId/release | control-plane · retention:hold — release a standing hold, with a reason |
POST /control-plane/presence/tickets | control-plane · the room kind’s own scope, named by the body |
POST {basePath}/presence/tickets | user — the declaring capability’s own read permission for the record |
GET {basePath}/presence/rooms/:kind/:recordId | public — the WebSocket upgrade, and a single-use ticket in the subprotocol offer is the credential |
GET /health | public — status and the deployed version |
POST /__pithy/workflows/:binding | the kit’s own durable-job dispatch |
GET /__pithy/dev-login | local development only |
/health is public because a health check that needs a credential is a health check nothing runs.
The two {basePath} presence routes mount under each capability that declares presence rooms, and only there. The socket’s strategy is public because a browser’s WebSocket sets no headers; the ticket in Sec-WebSocket-Protocol is what is checked, and a missing or bad one is refused before the upgrade.
Two things this list implies
Your asset allowlist is derived from this table. run_worker_first has to name the paths the Worker owns, and every path above is one — which is why the CLI computes the list rather than asking you to keep one by hand.
A capability you have not composed mounts nothing. These are not reserved paths waiting to be claimed. Remove the capability and its prefix is free.